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Over 20 recent antitrust cases have turned on whether competition in
complex durable-equipment markets prevents manufacturers from exercising
market power over proprietary aftermarket products and services. We show
that the price in the aftermarket will exceed marginal cost despite competi-
tion in the equipment market. Absent perfectly contingent long-term con-
tracts, firms will balance the advantages of marginal-cost pricing to future
generations of consumers against the payoff from monopoly pricing for
current, locked-in equipment owners. The result holds for undifferentiated
Bertrand competition, differentiated duopoly, and monopoly equipment mar-
kets. We also examine the effects of market growth and equipment durability.
1. Introduction
In the past decade, many independent providers of service for high-
technology products have sued equipment manufacturers for al-
legedly excluding them from providing maintenance services. Over
twenty antitrust cases have been brought against manufacturers such
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as Kodak, Prime Computer, Data General, Northern Telecom, Picker,
Unisys, Xerox, Rolm, Hewlett-Packard, EDS, General Electric, and
Siemens.1 The common feature in these cases is that the defendants
manufacture complex durable equipment for which customers de-
mand service, support, parts, andor upgrades for many years after
the initial sale. The economic interaction between the original equip-
ment market and aftermarkets is central to the analysis.
Most of the cases have a similar plot. The manufacturer sells one
brand of complex equipment in a market that is fairly competitive
Ž .e.g., the market for minicomputers . In addition, the manufacturer
sells aftermarket products to customers who purchased the original
equipment. Examples of aftermarket products include hardware
maintenance contracts, spare parts, and software upgrades. Due to
proprietary rights, the original manufacturer is often the exclusive
seller of at least one aftermarket product, such as replacement parts
or upgrades to the operating-system software. Plaintiffs charge that
the manufacturer exploits its aftermarket position in violation of
antitrust laws, typically by tying the purchase of an aftermarket
Ž .product that is also available from the plaintiffs usually service to
the manufacturer’s proprietary good, that is, by leveraging a monop-
oly over parts into a monopoly over service.
Once a customer purchases a particular brand of complex,
durable equipment, she is likely to be ‘‘locked in’’ to that manufac-
turer to some extent. There are often significant costs of switching to
another brand: retraining, sunk investments in custom software,
capital losses on the sale of the used equipment, etc. It would seem
that these switching costs could provide the manufacturer with room
to collect some monopoly rents by raising aftermarket prices above
cost.2 However, a manufacturer that exploits locked-in customers
with high aftermarket prices might make its equipment less attractive
when it competes with other manufacturers.
The question we address is fundamental: does substantial
competition in the durable-equipment market necessarily discipline
manufacturers so that they will not exercise market power in the
aftermarket? This has been the central claim in the many antitrust
cases cited, supported by expert testimony from a number of indus-
1. Each of the authors has advised parties to aftermarket antitrust cases.
2. A number of papers demonstrate how the presence of switching costs can endow
a firm with market power after consumers make their initial choice. See, e.g., Klem-
Ž . Ž .perer 1987 and Farrell and Shapiro 1987 . Well-known examples include computers
with proprietary operating software and printer toner cartridges for laser and inkjet
printers.
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trial organization economists.3 Although there is a recent flurry of
articles concerning aftermarket market power, none provide a formal
answer to this basic question.4 In this paper, we show that equipment
competition will not prevent firms from charging supracompetitive
prices in their proprietary aftermarkets; the incentive to exercise at
least some degree of market power in the aftermarket is unambigu-
ous.
Of course, this is not the only issue in the antitrust cases we
have cited, and we are not taking a position with regard to any
Ž .specific allegations of aftermarket monopolization. Shapiro 1995 has
wisely noted that the social welfare costs of some aftermarket ineffi-
ciencies may be small, and of course there are costs to fashioning a
Ž .policy remedy. Chen and Ross 1993 have shown that even when the
equipment market is monopolized, the welfare consequences of some
types of aftermarket exploitation are ambiguous. Our objective is to
focus attention on the use of aftermarket strategies by durable-goods
manufacturers. As a theoretical matter, the assertion that a competi-
tive equipment market prevents a firm from exercising market power
in the aftermarket is wrong. As a policy issue, we believe the
discussion should focus on the facts of each case and on an assess-
ment of how much harm will occur in each particular situation.
In Section 2 we review the recent legal history, emphasizing
how the central economic question has emerged from important fact
contexts. In particular, we discuss the role of lock-in and reputational
effects. We develop a differentiated Bertrand duopoly model in
Section 3 to address the incentive to exercise market power in the
aftermarket and its effect on welfare. This model not only approaches
perfect competition in the equipment market as the degree of differ-
entiation approaches zero, but it also allows for the existence of some
economic profits, which we argue as necessary in order to study how
reputation might affect the incentives to exploit aftermarkets. We find
that a reputation for low aftermarket prices does have value and that
firms will therefore price the aftermarket product below its monopoly
level. However, we also find that firms always price above cost for
the aftermarket product.
3. For example, Kodak argued before the Supreme Court that this proposition must
hold as a matter of theory: ‘‘even if it concedes monopoly share of the relevant parts
market, it cannot actually exercise the necessary market power for a Sherman Act
violation . . . equipment competition precludes any finding of monopoly power in the
 Ž .derivative aftermarkets’’ Kodak, 112 S. Ct. 2072 1992 at 20812182, emphasis in
original .
Ž . Ž . Ž .4. See, e.g., Borenstein et al. 1995 , Chen and Ross 1993, 1999 , and Shapiro 1995 .
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Assertions that equipment market competition will necessarily
discipline aftermarket behavior tend to refer to the equipment market
as ‘‘highly’’ competitive. Therefore, within the context of our differ-
entiated duopoly, we examine two issues. First, we consider the
effects on the aftermarket price as the degree of differentiation be-
tween the two firms approaches zero, so that we approach standard
Bertrand competition. We continue to find that service price remains
higher than cost.5 Then, we consider how the option to scrap used
equipment and buy new rather than purchase aftermarket service
affects the aftermarket price. We show that if the option to scrap and
buy new is binding on the margin, the aftermarket price is increas-
ing in the firm’s degree of equipment market power. These results
emphasize our main point for antitrust analysis: the exercise of
aftermarket market power is not ruled out by ‘‘highly competitive’’
equipment markets, but is a matter of degree. Rather than merely
assume that aftermarket market power is nonexistent or is significant
as a matter of theory, some degree of factual inquiry into the market
conditions is appropriate.
We extend the analysis in Section 4 by studying the aftermarket
pricing behavior of an equipment monopolist. The fundamental re-
sult is the same: we show that the aftermarket price is bounded away
from marginal cost, but also is not at the full monopoly aftermarket
level. We also show that the monopolist charges less in the aftermar-
ket than does a duopolist, at least in our spatial competition model.
We argue that this result has an intuitive explanation: the monopolist
can extract a larger share of the surplus created when it lowers the
Ž .aftermarket price by raising the equipment price than can a
duopolist, so the monopolist has a stronger incentive to keep the
aftermarket price down.
We conclude in Section 5 by summarizing our findings and
discussing some other incentives to monopolize aftermarkets—some
of which may benefit and others of which may harm consumers—that
are not modeled here.
5. Alternatively, in the appendix, available at www.umich.edu jmmpapers
aftmkt-appendix.pdf, we develop a model of a perfectly competitive equipment market
in which each equipment firm monopolizes its service market. We find once again that
service price will be above cost. Competition in the equipment market causes firms to
make zero profits overall, but a welfare loss occurs due to an aftermarket price above
cost.
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2. Aftermarket Economic Power in
the Courts
There are numerous cases before the federal courts that involve
claims of antitrust violations in aftermarkets for service products.
Two have recently reached the Supreme Court. In the first, firms
selling service for Kodak high-volume photocopiers and micro-
graphic equipment alleged that Kodak adopted a restrictive policy on
the availability of spare parts, including tying sales of spare parts to
the purchase of other maintenance services from Kodak. The Court
upheld the Circuit Court’s denial of Kodak’s motion for summary
judgment, concluding that ‘‘it is clearly reasonable to infer that
Kodak has market power to raise prices and drive out competition in
 the aftermarkets . . . and . . . to infer that Kodak chose to gain imme-
diate profits by exerting that market power where locked-in cus-
tomers, high information costs, and discriminatory pricing limited
and perhaps eliminated any long-term loss’’ Kodak, 112 S. Ct. 2072
Ž . 1992 at 2088 . The Kodak case then went to trial; Kodak lost on this
issue at trial and on appeal Image Tech Services v. Eastern Kodak Co.,
Ž .125 F3d. 1995 Ninth Circuit, 1997 . In another case, an independent
service company alleged that Prime Computer had tied the sale of
software support and upgrades to the purchase of hardware mainte-
nance from Prime. Prior to the Supreme Court decision in Kodak, the
Sixth Circuit had accepted Prime’s argument that competition in the
equipment market would necessarily discipline aftermarket prices.
The Supreme Court overturned this decision shortly after deciding
Kodak. The Sixth Circuit then decided that sufficient evidence had
been presented to support a finding that it was profitable for Prime to
monopolize the service aftermarket Virtual Maintenance v. Prime
Ž . 6Computer, 11 F3d. 660 Sixth Circuit, 1993 .
Two main features that distinguish aftermarkets have emerged
in the many antitrust cases before the courts: the role of customer
lock-in establishing market power and the possibility that reputation
effects will prevent manufacturers from profitably exploiting what-
ever economic power they have in service aftermarkets. We discuss
these factors now, before proceeding to our formal model.
6. Three recent cases have narrowly interpreted or partially conflicted with the
Ž .Supreme Court in Kodak. See MacKie-Mason and Metzler 1999 for a discussion of
these.
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2.1 Customer Lock-In
The availability of substitutes limits a manufacturer’s ability to charge
above-competitive prices for its aftermarket products. An aftermarket
customer would choose to sell or scrap the used equipment and
purchase anew from a different manufacturer if the original seller
raised the service price sufficiently. The extent to which switching
costs discourage a customer from changing brands affects how much
room the manufacturer has to raise the service price.
The equipment involved in most of the recent antitrust cases is
quite sophisticated. The products include minicomputers, hospital CT
scanners, telephone PBX switches, high-volume photocopiers, and
micrographic reproduction equipment. In every case, users and ex-
perts have testified to the high costs of switching.7 Evidence intro-
duced in the Wang 8 case showed that typically about 80 percent of
minicomputer consumers buy the same brand when they replace
their equipment.
Previous work has demonstrated the role of switching costs in
creating market power, but it has focused on a single product to
which the consumer becomes locked in.9 There has been little atten-
tion to a firm that sells equipment in a competitive market but sells
service to locked-in customers.10 When there are two interrelated
markets, the central question becomes the ability of the manufacturer
to profitably exercise economic power in one market without a larger
adverse impact on profits in the other market.
2.2 Reputation and Imperfect Competition
Manufacturers face two types of customers: those who already own
equipment and those who are purchasing for the first time. Although
customers who already own equipment may face significant costs of
switching brands and thus provide the manufacturer with an oppor-
tunity to price supracompetitively, de novo customers do not. Do
potential new customers provide sufficient competitive discipline in
the aftermarket? The answer depends on reputation effects. It may
7. For example, a senior design systems manager for Ford Motor Co. testified in
Virtual that switching from Prime minicomputers to another brand would shut Ford
Ž .down. See also Kodak, 112 S. Ct. 2072 1992 at 2087.
8. Systemcare, Inc. v. Wang Laboratories, D.C. Colo., No. 89-B-1778.
Ž . Ž .9. See, for example, Farrell and Shapiro 1987 , Klemperer 1987 , and Beggs and
Ž .Klemperer 1992 .
Ž .10. For an exception, see Chen and Ross 1999 . In that paper the authors argue that
firms charge above-cost service prices to recover higher costs from heavy users during
a warranty period.
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not be profitable for a manufacturer to charge above-competitive
aftermarket prices to locked-in service customers if the information
easily spreads, inducing potential new consumers to purchase other
brands. The direction of this reputation incentive is clear, but its
magnitude has not been shown to be great enough to keep aftermar-
ket prices at competitive levels. In particular, it is necessary to study
reputation effects, taking into account the incentives facing other
manufacturers. The pressure from new customers may not be suffi-
cient if the other manufacturers are also charging above-competitive
aftermarket prices.
The trade-off between earning profits by exercising market
power in aftermarkets and losing profits in equipment sales from a
reputation for exploiting locked-in service customers has caused
some confusion in the courts. The appellate court in Virtual originally
argued that ‘‘lock-in theory is viable only when the producer can
charge its customer monopoly prices without fear of being replaced
Žby competitors due to the customer’s substantial investments’’ Vir-
.tual, 957 F.2d 1318 at 1328 . However, it is not necessary to charge the
full monopoly aftermarket price in order to exploit economic power,
nor does the loss of some customers for new equipment necessarily
offset the profits from service. The Supreme Court observed in Kodak
that even monopolists have to give up sales when they raise prices,
yet they find it profitable to charge higher than competitive prices
 Ž . 112 S. Ct. 2072 1992 at 2084 , and that short of charging the full
monopoly price for service, ‘‘there could be a middle, optimum price
at which the increased revenues from the higher-priced sales of
service and parts would more than compensate for the lower rev-
Ž .enues from lost equipment sales’’ id. . The proper question, then, is
the severity of the impact anticompetitive behavior in an aftermarket
will have on profitability in the equipment market.
The incentive to establish a reputation for low aftermarket
prices depends on the manufacturer anticipating the possibility of
earning above-normal profits after it has built such a reputation.
Thus, there must be some product differentiation or other source of
profits or quasi-rents in the equipment market. In fact, vigorous but
imperfect competition characterizes many durable-equipment mar-
kets. Complex, high-technology products tend to be differentiated,
even if they are similar enough that customers can consider them as
partial substitutes. For example, Wang minicomputers tended to be
favored by customers who needed strong document and image-
processing capabilities; DEC computers by scientific and engineering
users; and IBM minicomputers by those with large databases to
process. Northern Telecom PBX telephone switches were designed to
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maintain complete ‘‘upward’’ compatibility so that customers can
expand and upgrade their system without replacing it; AT & T pro-
duced different lines of switches that are not all upwardly compati-
ble.
In this section, we have shown that the courts have begun to
recognize that durable-equipment manufacturers face a trade-off be-
tween above-competitive aftermarket profits from locked-in cus-
tomers and competitive losses in the equipment market. In the next
section, we analyze this trade-off in a model with imperfectly com-
petitive equipment sellers in Section 3 and in Section 4 with a
monopoly equipment seller. We use these models to study the role of
reputation.
3. A Model of Competition with
Monopolized Aftermarkets
In this section, we present a simple characteristic-space model of
competition between two differentiated products where the markets
for the associated aftermarket goods are monopolized by the original
equipment manufacturers. The model has the attractive feature that
as the ‘‘transportation costs’’ approach zero, the model approaches
one of undifferentiated Bertrand competition. It also can be adapted
for comparison with a monopoly supplier of both the primary and the
aftermarket good, as we show in the following section. Using this
model, we show that competitive firms will always have an incentive
Ž .to price their monopoly aftermarket sales above competitive levels,
even as the degree of differentiation between the firms becomes
arbitrarily small and the foremarket becomes arbitrarily close to
undifferentiated Bertrand competition. We demonstrate that no equi-
librium can exist in which the price of the aftermarket product
always is set equal to marginal cost.
3.1 Model Assumptions
Consider the markets for a durable good, which we call equipment,
and an associated aftermarket product, which we call service. We
suppose there are two firms, a and b, from whom the customer may
purchase new equipment, but that each equipment manufacturer is
the only seller of service associated with its brand.11 Thus, after
11. For now we suppress subscripts denoting different equipment brands, because
the modeling assumptions hold for each brand. We introduce brand subscripts below
when we begin to analyze consumer choice between brands.
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buying and using equipment in period t, in period t  1 the con-
Ž .sumer can 1 use the product in its depreciated state with no
Ž .addition of service, 2 buy some quantity of service from the same
Ž .manufacturer to enhance the equipment, or 3 scrap the used equip-
ment and purchase new equipment again, from either manufacturer.12
The equipment and service products each have constant unit
production costs, C and c respectively, identical for all firms. We
assume that consumers are locked in to their equipment manufac-
turer if they want to purchase service: an owner of firm a’s equip-
ment cannot buy service from firm b. However, we do not need to
assume lock-in costs for subsequent equipment purchases, and thus
for simplicity do not introduce equipment brand switching costs.13
That is, a consumer can buy any brand from any vendor with no
penalty, regardless of which brand she may have purchased in the
past. We further assume that there is no asymmetric information
between buyers and sellers.
The firms are located at opposite ends of a unit-length character-
istic-space line. Consumers’ most preferred points in the space are
distributed uniformly along the line, with the total number of con-
sumers normalized to one. Each consumer has a reservation value, s,
for the ‘‘ideal’’ good located at the consumer’s most preferred point
in characteristic space. This value is high enough that each consumer
buys one unit of the good from the dealer that offers the highest
expected discounted consumer surplus. All consumers have equal
‘‘travel’’ costs,  per unit distance, that reflect the loss in consumer
surplus from having to consume a good that differs from the con-
sumer’s most preferred characteristic. Since this cost is associated
with persistent product differentiation, it is incurred in every period,
whether the consumer uses new or old equipment.
Thus, a consumer located at distance d from firm a receives
gross surplus from owning the equipment: CS1  s   d from using
2 Ž .a new product and CS  s   d  h  f q from using a period-old
product that has been augmented with q units of service, where h
represents the depreciation in the value of the product from one
Ž .period of use. The function f  is the consumer surplus from q units
12. We assume enough homogeneity across consumers that there will be no
polymorphous equilibrium with some consumers buying used equipment from others
who then buy new. Allowing for enough heterogeneity to support trade in used goods
does not change our main result.
13. Adding brand-switching costs would strengthen our results; that is, with
brand-switching costs aftermarket prices would deviate even farther from marginal
cost.
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of service, and is simply the integral of the inverse demand for
Ž . Ž . Ž .service, with f 0  0, f   0, and f   0.
To make the analysis informative, we assume for each brand
Ž . Ž Ž .. Ž .that 1 s   d  h  f q c  cq c  s   d  C for some q  0
Ž . Ž .and 2 f 0  c. The first assumption ensures that reusing the
period-old product would be preferred to buying a new unit of the
same brand each period if both new equipment and service were
priced at cost. The second assumption assures that purchase of at
least a small quantity of service would give positive net consumer
surplus if it were priced at cost. Together, the two assumptions imply
that in a first-best solution consumers use a unit of equipment for
two periods and purchase some positive quantity of service in the
second period.
We need to specify the flow of consumers into the market over
time. For now, we assume that there are two equal-sized consumer
cohorts who first want to purchase new equipment in successive
periods. If consumers use equipment for two periods, then they
reappear as customers for new equipment in the third period, and we
have a stationary overlapping-generations model.14 We assume con-
sumers live forever and have an infinite decision horizon subject to
discounting with a factor  per period. We will return to the issue of
market growth or decline below.
The fundamental assumption of our analysis is that firms cannot
credibly commit to future service prices. Therefore, to complete the
model we must specify consumer beliefs about future service prices,
since they are purchasing equipment with a useful life of two peri-
ods, and the value of new equipment today will depend on the
expected service price tomorrow. We take a simple approach to
beliefs: consumers take the firm’s service price in period t to be the
best indicator of the price the firm will charge in period t  1.
There are several points that support our use of this simple
assumption. First, costs and the number of consumers are constant
over time in our model and the horizon is infinite, so there are no
exogenous drivers that would tend to make prices change over time.
Second, this model of consumer beliefs corresponds closely to actual
behavior suggested by the evidence of many aftermarket antitrust
cases.15 Third, and most importantly, our goal is to examine the claim
14. Alternatively, one could view this as new equal-sized cohorts appearing every
period and living for two periods.
15. Testimony in many of the legal cases cited in the previous section indicates that
consumers who consider service costs at all in choosing among brands make roughly
this assumption. We are aware of no cases in which attempts to calculate ‘‘lifetime’’
costs of equipment have included forecasts of future changes in service prices beyond
simple extrapolation or inflation adjustment.
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that the service price will always be set at the competitive level. Since
costs do not change over time in the model, consumers’ expectations
of constant prices over time will be fulfilled if this claim holds true.
For now we suppose that in equilibrium the price of service is
sufficiently low relative to the price of new equipment from each firm
that consumers will always prefer to keep and service used equip-
ment after one period, rather than scrap it and buy new each period.
We return to this assumption below in order to study the constrain-
ing effect that the option to scrap used and buy new has on service
pricing.
We summarize the model before we undertake the analysis:
 A steady number of new customers arrive to purchase equipment
from one of two firms in any period.
 Equipment is sufficiently durable that consumers choose to keep it
for two periods, while purchasing service to enhance its second-
period value.
 Consumers expect future service prices to be the same as current
prices.
 Firms are monopolists over service for their own brand of equip-
ment, but set the service price knowing that current service prices
affect current consumer willingness to pay for new equipment.
 Equipment prices are set under conditions of differentiated product
duopoly competition, with a uniform distribution of consumer
types along a characteristics line separating the two equipment
brands.
3.2 Analysis of the Duopoly Model
We have specified a rather general infinite-horizon overlapping-gen-
erations duopoly game. Our goal is not to find all equilibria of this
game, however. We are motivated by the fundamental question
repeatedly raised in antitrust lawsuits and the ensuing academic
discussion: will competition in the equipment market sufficiently
discipline aftermarket service pricing so that there is no exercise of
monopoly power in the aftermarket? We interpret an exercise of
aftermarket market power to imply that pt  c for at least some
periods t, where p is the aftermarket price. Therefore, we ask the
following question: is there an equilibrium in the market described in
which firms choose a constant service price equal to marginal cost in
every period: pt  c,  t?
Our approach is to use the necessary conditions for a constant-
tprice equilibrium to show that if such an equilibrium exists, p  p 
c, i.e., service price will always be above cost. That is sufficient to
answer the main question, since if a nonconstant-price equilibrium
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exists, it is straightforward to show that it must have pt  c in at
least some periods t.16 After we show that in a constant-price equilib-
Ž .rium if one exists service price is above cost, we will establish that
Marshallian welfare is less than it would be if marginal-cost service
pricing prevailed in all periods, thus establishing that this exercise of
market power has adverse welfare consequences.
After establishing the main result, we further interpret the
necessary conditions to characterize the effects of the discount rate or
market growth rate on service pricing. We then examine how varia-
tions in the degree of equipment competition—from undifferentiated
Bertrand competition to monopoly markets—affect the result that
service is priced above cost. Finally, we consider the effect that
competition from new equipment has on service prices, and with this
generalized model we can also examine how the degree of equipment
durability affects service pricing.
Consider the consumer surplus from equipment purchased in
the current period and service on that equipment in the next period.
If a consumer located at distance d from firm a assumes that she will
face the same price for service next period as a offers currently, p ,a
she gets expected net consumer surplus from brand a of
   Ž Ž .. Ž . Ž .CS  s   d  P   s   d  h  f q p  p q p , 1a a a a a
where capital P refers to equipment and small p and q refer to the
service product. The consumer is distance 1  d from firm b, so her
expected consumer surplus from firm b is given by
 Ž . CS  s   1  d  Pb b
 Ž . Ž Ž .. Ž . Ž .  s   1  d  h  f q p  p q p . 2b b b
The consumer who is indifferent between buying from firm a
and from firm b marks the boundary between the two firms’ mar-
kets. Setting the consumer surpluses equal and solving for d yields
ˆthe market boundary, denoted d:
Ž . Ž . 1    P  P  b aˆ Ž .d  , 3Ž .2 1  
16. After we prove our main result, it is easy to show that no equilibrium exists in
ˆt t ˆwhich p  c for some t and p  c for all other t  t.
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where , a function of p and p , is the difference in the net surplusa b
of each brand, a and b, that the consumer would receive in the
second period after buying service:17
Ž . Ž .  cs p  cs pa b
 Ž Ž .. Ž .  Ž Ž .. Ž . f q p  p q p  f q p  p q p .a a a b b b
We assume that production costs of both the equipment and
service products are linear in quantity; without further loss of gener-
ality, we take these costs to be zero, so that firm a’s equipment and
service profit on one generation of equipment sales is given by
ˆ ˆ ˆŽ .   Ž .  P d   p q p d  d P   , 4a a a a a a
Ž .where   p q p , the profit per unit of equipment from sales ofa a a
service, and similarly for firm b.
We now proceed to characterize the profit-maximizing equip-
ment and service prices for each firm through analysis of necessary
conditions for an equilibrium. To do this, we derive the infinite-hori-
zon value function for each firm at a given moment in time, assum-
ing an arbitrary initial market share, d0.
Recall that we restrict our analysis to constant pricing strategies,
so the choice variables are P t  P and pt  p,  t, for each firm. If
firm a expects to face a steady stream of customers choosing between
brands for new equipment in that period, then it will earn profits
̂ from each customer generation of d P   . If the firm expectsa a
stationary equilibrium behavior from its competitor,18 then, given a
current market share of d0 for customers already locked in, the
present value of its stream of profits forevermore will be

0 ˆŽ . Ž .  Ž . Ž .V  d  p  d P , P , p , p P   p 1  . 5a a a a b a b a a a ž /1  
Ž .A strategy choice is a simultaneous announcement of P, p , so
necessary conditions for an optimal strategy can be found from the
17. To guarantee that the duopolists cover the entire market, we also assume that
the gross surplus from service-augmented equpiment is sufficiently large compared to
 Ž Ž .. Ž .the travel cost: s   s  h  f q p  1.5 1   . If the inequality does not hold,a
then the duopolists will earn higher profits by pricing in such a way that the markets
of the two do not overlap; that is, each duopolist chooses to be a local monopolist.
18. If a constant-price equilibrium exists, then these expectations will be fulfilled
when that equilibrium is realized.
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ˆŽ .stationary points of V with respect to P, p . Substituting for d from
Ž . Ž .3 and setting the derivative of 5 with respect to P equal to zero,a
we obtain firm a’s best-response function:
Ž . Ž . 1    P     b a Ž .P  . 6a 2
Doing likewise for P , and then solving the two equations simultane-b
ously, yields two necessary conditions for equilibrium equipment
prices that are solely a function of service prices and exogenous
factors:

Ž .  Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .P   1     p , p   p  2 p 7a a b b b a a3
and

Ž .  Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .P   1     p , p   p  2 p . 8b a b a a b b3
We can substitute these expressions into V and take the deriva-a
tive with respect to the service price p to obtaina
 Ž . Ž .	 V  1       2   a a b a0 Ž . d    , 9a Ž .	 p 1   2 6 1   3a
where primes indicate derivatives with respect to p . The first term isa
the change in current-period profits on service from raising p . Thea
second term has three factors, the first of which is the present-value
factor for the infinite-horizon stream of profits. The second factor is
equal to the firm’s equilibrium market share or quantity sold of
ˆequipment, d, after substituting in the solutions for optimal equip-
ment prices P and P . The third factor is proportional to thea b
difference between the loss in consumer surplus and the gain in
profits from an increase in the price for service p . The difference isa
the marginal deadweight loss from raising the price of service.
Ž .To evaluate this expression, note that at p  0 marginal cost ,a
total surplus is maximized, and thus marginal surplus      0.a
That is, to a first-order, a slight increase in the price of service from
marginal cost raises service profits by the same amount that it lowers
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consumer surplus. Then
	 Va 0 Ž . d   0, 10a	 pa p 0a
and a profit-maximizing firm with an installed base will always set
the price of the service product above marginal cost.
We have now proven our main result:
Result 1: No equilibrium exists in which the firms charge a service
price equal to marginal cost in every period. If a constant-price equilibrium
does exist, the firms charge a service price above marginal cost.
This result is quite general, not an artifact of the specific model.
If the price of service is equal to its marginal cost, a small increase in
that price will have only a second-order effect on future profits once
the price of the equipment is optimally adjusted downward, because
this creates only second-order deadweight loss; but it will have a
first-order effect on current-period profits from selling the service
product, because the associated equipment units already have been
sold. For this reason, it will always be profitable for the firm to raise
the price of service above marginal cost.
In fact, this result relies on none of the attributes of the spatial
Ž . Ž .model beyond the value function 5 . Equation 5 makes it clear that
there are two fundamental forces at work in the firm’s optimization
problem at any point in time. The second term on the right-hand side
Ž .of 5 is the present value of profits the firm could earn in aggregate
from every generation of buyers except those who have already
purchased from it. Given the consumer beliefs we have posited, the
firm could charge a price equal to marginal cost for service starting
today, and in that way could exactly maximize the profit it earns on
Ž   .all future generations of buyers recall at p  c we have     0 .a
If that were the entire calculation, the firm would simply price
service at its marginal cost. But at any point in time, the firm will also
Ž .have the first term on the right-hand side of 5 . This term represents
the profit it can earn on the consumers who have already purchased
their equipment. This term is maximized by charging the monopoly
price for service. As we show in the next subsection, the firm would
like to charge the monopoly service price to these locked-in cus-
tomers while still assuring future customers that it will charge a
Ž .lower price equal to marginal cost when they return to buy service.
This is exactly what the firm would do if it could make a binding
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commitment to future prices, but we are interested in the typical case
in which long-term complete contracts are not feasible.
3.3 Locked-in Customers and Commitment
Since the result relies crucially on the installed base of customers who
already own equipment, d0, one might wonder if our conclusion fails
Žwhen there is no installed base or for a new entrant in a model that
.permits entry . Our result is robust to this concern. We have exam-
ined the necessary conditions for an equilibrium in which the firms
choose to restrict themselves to constant pricing over time. It is easy
to show, however, that at t  0, with no installed-base customers, a
constant-price strategy with p  c cannot be optimal in the wider
strategy space that includes the possibility of nonconstant pricing
over time. To see this, suppose that the firm did announce p  c in
the first period. In the second period it would have some installed
0Ž 0 0 0 0.base d P , P , p , p . At this point, it would pay to deviate froma b a b
p  c by reverting to the strategy we analyzed above, with p  c.
The main claim holds: if the firm cannot precommit to service prices
over the lifetime of equipment, it will not be profitable to follow a
strategy of constant service prices equal to cost.
Ž .Further examination of the first-order condition 9 also leads to
the conclusion that the firm will not choose to charge the static
monopoly price for service, where    0, either. At that point, thea
Ž .first term in 9 would be zero. The second term, however, would be
negative,19 so the derivative of the value function with respect to pa
would be negative. Thus, if a constant-price equilibrium exists, it will
occur with a price of service that is strictly greater than marginal cost,
but strictly less than the static monopoly price.20
Would the firms prefer to commit to marginal-cost pricing if
Žthey could? Suppose a commitment ‘‘technology’’ e.g., feasible long-
.term complete contracts were introduced at some date when the two
firms already have some locked-in customers. We show that in this
case it would be an equilibrium for both firms to charge the full
monopoly service price to current locked-in service customers, but to
commit to charge a service price equal to marginal cost thereafter.
Ž . Ž .19. The factor  1   is positive for the relevant range of   0, 1 . The second
factor is positive so long as firm a has positive market share. The factor     isa
negative for p  0, because price increases above marginal cost decrease consumera
surplus by more than they increase profits, thus creating increased deadweight loss.
Hence, the product of these three factors will be negative.
20. The two results on the first-order condition for the value function at p  0a
Ž .mc and p  p are sufficient to guarantee that there is at least one local maximuma m
for mc  p  p .a m
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First, reconsider firm a’s necessary condition for optimal service
Ž .pricing in 9 . With a commitment technology, firm a can now charge
a different price to current locked-in service customers and future
Ž .equipment purchasers, so the two terms in 9 are decoupled and the
firm optimizes by setting them separately to zero. This occurs when
Ž  .the current service price is the monopoly price   0 , and thea
Žfuture service price is set to marginal cost so that total marginal
  .surplus     0 . The symmetric analysis holds for firm b.a
Ž . Ž .From 7 and 8 , both firms then charge an equipment price
Ž .P  P   1   . With equal service and equipment prices theya b
1ˆ  Ž .split the market, d  from 3 , and each firm earns profits 2
1 Ž .   1   on each two-period generation of equipment sales from2
Ž . Ž . Ž .4 . By comparison, without commitment, 7 and 9 would lead
Ž .firm a to charge P   1     , and two-period generationala a
1 Ž .  Ž .profits would still be    1   from 4 . Thus, if both firms2
did commit, the profits on all future generations of equipment sales
would be the same as in the no-commitment case. However, they
would be able to charge the monopoly service price on current
locked-in customers, and, as we showed above, the no-commitment
price is less than the monopoly price. Thus, both firms are better off
with commitment than without.
When commitment is possible, it is an equilibrium for both
firms to commit to charging p  mc in the aftermarket in all future
periods. To see this, suppose firm a deviates to a noncommitment
strategy. The future service price will be set above marginal cost, and
Žthe current service price will be set equal to the future price by
.assumption , below the monopoly price as shown above. Obviously,
profits on current locked-in customers will fall. In addition, when
Ž Ž ..  Ž Ž ..p increases for future customers,     f q p  f q p a a a b
Ž .p q p decreases because consumer surplus decreases, and thusb b
per-customer generational profits on new equipment sales fall. The
same calculation on    implies that P   increases, and thusa a
firm a’s market share, not surprisingly, will fall, so it earns smaller
generational profits on fewer customers. Thus, each term in the value
Ž .function 5 decreases, and firm a does not wish to deviate from
committing to future marginal cost pricing of service. The symmetric
analysis holds for firm b, and simultaneous commitment is a Nash
equilibrium.
Consumers also benefit from the introduction of a commitment
technology. As the price of the aftermarket product rises, consumers
lose on the inframarginal and marginal units of service. Because the
duopolists compete for the consumers in the equipment market, the
loss to consumers on the inframarginal units is recovered via a lower
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equipment price. The consumers do not, however, recover the loss of
net consumer surplus on the marginal units. Thus marginal-cost
service pricing is a Pareto improvement.21
It might appear that in our analysis effectively we have allowed
the firm to commit to future prices, since consumers assume that
tomorrow’s price is the same as today’s. However, this merely im-
plies that if the firm follows a constant-price strategy, consumer
beliefs will be fulfilled. There is nothing about the beliefs assumption
that stops the firm from raising price. It is true that for our proof of
Result 1 we assumed the firms follow constant-price strategies. We
did not, however, allow the firm to make an enforceable commitment
Ž .to charge a constant price equal to marginal cost . Thus, it is not
possible in our model for the firm to charge the monopoly price to
current locked-in customers and marginal cost to all future cus-
tomers, which is what it would do if commitment were possible.
3.4 The Effect of the Discount Rate and
Market Growth
Ž .From 9 we can see the effect of the discount rate:
Result 2: If a constant-price equilibrium exists, the exercise of market
power in the service market will be greater the higher is the discount rate.
As  goes to zero, so that future profits receive a decreasing
Ž  .weight, service is priced closer to the static monopoly level   0 .a
As  goes to one, so that future profits receive an increasing weight,
Žservice is priced closer to marginal cost using L’Hopital’s rule, theˆ
  .first-order condition requires     0, which implies p  0 .a a
Although  is the discount factor, it can be interpreted as measuring
change in the expected size of the market. If the market is growing
over time, then a higher market share for future equipment sales is of
greater value, assuming that new customers in the market learn of
aftermarket pricing reputations. The greater weight on future sales
21. Similar reasoning allows us to rule out an equilibrium in which pt  c for some
t̂ ˆt and p  c for all other t  t. A price below marginal cost for service raises
Ž .expected consumer surplus by less than it lowers producer profits, so even ignoring
the incentive to exploit locked-in consumers with a higher service price, a producer
could increase its profits and consumers’ expected surplus at the time they buy the
equipment by raising its service price to be always equal to marginal cost and lowering
its equipment price commensurately.
Market Power in Proprietary Aftermarkets 175
can be expressed as an increase in  .22 If the market is declining in
size, then future market shares is less valuable, implying a lower 
and an increase in the price of service towards the monopoly level.
3.5 The Effect of Increasing Competition
The antitrust cases that in part motivated this inquiry generally
assume that the market for equipment is ‘‘highly competitive.’’ It is
not always clear just what is meant, but in many cases there is little
disagreement that the equipment market is competitive. Therefore,
we would like to answer the question whether a perfectly competitive
equipment market sufficiently disciplines the service market that the
aftermarket price will be equal to marginal cost.
Elsewhere we present a finite-horizon model with a perfectly
Žcompetitive equipment market. Please see the appendix available
at www.umich.edu-jmmpapersaftmkt-appendix.pdf for a formal
.analysis of the perfectly competitive equipment market model. Our
main result holds: there is not an equilibrium in which service prices
are always equal to marginal cost. In fact, we can show the stronger
result that in equilibrium service prices are always above marginal
cost; indeed, in some parts of the parameter space the service price is
set at the monopoly level. However, when we try to solve an
infinite-horizon model comparable to the model in this section, an
equilibrium does not exist.23 The problem is simple, but fundamental:
with free entry in the equipment market, there are no intrinsic rents
to equipment manufacturing. With zero profits, there is no incentive
to build and maintain a reputation for low service prices. Instead,
with the static expectations that we assume for consumers, firms
lower service prices to build market share, and then revert to high
prices to exploit their customer base. This dynamic prevents the
existence of an equilibrium. However, we can show that the main
result continues to hold by demonstrating that setting service prices
equal to marginal cost in every period is not an equilibrium.
22. Strictly speaking, this interpretation only holds precisely if the market growth
rate is such that it can represented by a once-and-for-all increase in  , so that  is at a
higher level but still constant over time. If  changes for a firm, however, we would
expect firms to change their aftermarket pricing—e.g., raising aftermarket prices as it
becomes apparent that a product is likely to exit the market earlier than had previously
been expected. In such cases, the consumers’ static expectations would not be fulfilled
over the periods in which  changes.
23. Analogous existence problems arise in the quality-reputation literature. See,
Ž .e.g., Klein and Leffler 1981 .
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In this section we take a different approach to showing the effect
that increasing equipment competition has on the pricing of aftermar-
ket service. As we let the ‘‘transport’’ cost  go to zero, the degree of
product differentiation in our duopoly model goes to zero. In the
limit, we have an undifferentiated Bertrand duopoly game, and the
usual outcome obtains: industry profits are competed to zero. Even
with undifferentiated product Bertrand competition, service is still
priced above cost, and our main result holds: equipment market
competition does not induce competitive aftermarket pricing.
To see the result, examine the necessary conditions for a con-
Ž .stant-pricing equilibrium, 9 . As   0, the second term in square
brackets has a denominator that goes to zero. In order to satisfy this
first-order condition, then, the service price must be chosen so that
the numerator also goes to zero. That is, as   0 then     a b
 0. Using this fact and taking the limit of the equipment market
Ž .price in 7 as   0, we get P   , which is to say that thea a
Ž .two-period profits in equation 4 go to zero. By applying L’Hopital’sˆ
ˆŽ .rule to expression 3 for the market-share boundary d, we see that
1ˆŽ .the market is evenly split d  . Thus, as product differentiation2
Žgoes to zero, we get the standard Bertrand duopoly result with
.symmetric costs that industry profits are competed to zero and the
market is equally divided.
Ž .If we now evaluate the limit of the necessary condition 9 with
service price equal to cost, p  0, as we did before, we see that thea
same result holds: if there is a constant-price equilibrium, it must be
that the service price in that equilibrium is above cost, because the
derivative of the value function with respect to price is positive when
Ž .evaluated at marginal cost, as in expression 10 .
This result for undifferentiated Bertrand duopoly shares another
feature with our finite-horizon perfect-competition model: we can
show that equipment is priced below its marginal cost. Service prices
are above cost, and thus service profits are positive. However, we
have shown above that two-period profits from the sale of equipment
and service are zero. Thus, equipment profits are negative, or P  C;
undifferentiated Bertrand competitors lower equipment prices to
compete away all of the anticipated service profits.
As in the differentiated duopoly case, the ability to commit to
efficient service prices yields a Pareto improvement. Although firm
profits remain at zero and thus are not improved, consumers are
made better off. The intuition for the formal argument is the follow-
ing: all consumers buy equipment in either case, so first-period social
welfare is unchanged. The reduction in second-period service price
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reduces deadweight loss from the choice of how much service to
purchase, so second-period—and overall—welfare is increased. Firm
profits are zero in both cases, so consumers must be better off.
More generally, we can evaluate the role of competition by
Ž .looking at the conditions for a steady state in this model. Equation 9
and the equivalent condition for p implicitly define best-responseb
functions that together determine an equilibrium at any point in time.
0 ˆIn steady state, however, a third condition must hold, d  d. In this
case, the static expectations about service prices that we have as-
Ž .sumed for consumers are fulfilled. Imposing this condition on 9 ,
ˆ Ž . Ž . Ž .again substituting for d from 3 , 7 , and 8 , and then factoring out
ˆthe d expression gives the steady-state conditions
 Ž . Ž .	 V 1        2   a a b a       0,aŽ .	 p 2 6 1   1   3a
Ž .11
and the equivalent expression for p . The first factor is the equilib-b
rium market share, so for the equilibrium to exist at an interior
solution, the second term must be equal to zero. We can see from this
that the degree to which the price of service exceeds the cost of
providing service depends only on the shape of the demand curve for
service and the degree to which the firm discounts future profits.
Notably,  does not appear in the second factor. The extent of
substitutability among brands in the equipment market, which deter-
mines the severity of competition, does not affect the equilibrium
price of the aftermarket product in this model.24
This surprising result depends on the assumption that a con-
sumer’s strength of preference between brands,  , and location on the
line is uncorrelated with her demand for the aftermarket product.
When this is true, the service price is not a useful policy instrument
for maximizing profits as the level of competition changes. The firm
sets service price to optimally balance the reputation and lock-in
market power incentives. It responds to changes in competition only
by adjusting its equipment price. In some situations, however,  may
not be independent of the demand for service or the importance of
reputation. In those cases, the changes in  can influence the after-
market price, as we discuss in Section 5. More importantly, this result
24. This result is conditional on our current assumption that new equipment is not
an economically viable alternative to servicing used equipment. We relax this assump-
tion below.
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will not necessarily hold if consumers consider abandonment of the
equipment after one period a realistic alternative, as we will discuss
below.
Ž .While equation 11 and the equivalent expression for p to-b
gether characterize the steady state in this market, we have not
studied the dynamic path to the steady state. Away from the steady
state, the optimum conditions for service prices will not be exactly as
Ž .shown in 11 , because there will be a dynamic consideration: a given
share of equipment sales this period will affect the optimal service
price next period, which will help determine the share of equipment
sales next period and thus the optimal service price in two periods,
etc. In that process, it appears that  might affect the degree of
above-cost pricing of the aftermarket product. Nonetheless, competi-
tion will still fail to drive the aftermarket price to marginal cost.
3.6 Competition between Service and
New Equipment
We have thus far analyzed the model without recognizing the possi-
bility that consumers might abandon equipment after one period and
purchase new equipment rather than servicing the used equipment.
Given the structure of the model—in which consumers are homoge-
neous except for their location on the line and must pay the trans-
portation cost each period regardless of whether they service used
equipment or buy new—it is clear that there will be a threshold price
of service relative to equipment that would induce all of the cus-
tomers of a firm to abandon their used equipment. This would never
be efficient under the assumptions of the model, and a firm would
always be better off setting price just below this threshold than
inducing equipment abandonment.
Thus, there are two types of equilibria that could occur, depend-
ing on whether or not the equipment abandonment constraint is
binding. To assure that the consumer services equipment in the
second period rather than abandoning it and buying new, the neces-
Ž Ž .. Ž .sary condition is that s   d  P  s   d  h  f q p  p q p ,a a a a
Ž Ž .. Ž .or P  h  f q p  p q p . This constraint is more likely to binda a a a
Ž .if equipment is inexpensive P small relative to the loss in valuea
from using a second-period piece of equipment after optimal servic-
 Ž Ž .. Ž .ing h  f q p  p q p . If equipment is very expensive and useda a a
equipment has high value relative to new, then this constraint won’t
bind and the discussion above will correctly characterize the market.
If the constraint does bind, then new equipment competes with
servicing used equipment, which changes the effects of competition
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among sellers. Given symmetry between firms,   0 and    .a b
Ž .Plugging these conditions into the equilibrium equipment price 7 ,
Ž . Ž .we have P   1    3  . Then the equipment servicinga a
Ž Ž .. Ž . Ž .condition can be rewritten as f q p  p q p  h   1   a a a
Ž .3  . What is noteworthy about this result is that  , the degree ofa
competition between the firms, now matters: as competition increases
Ž . falls , the consumer must be left with more consumer surplus from
service to prevent her from abandoning her used equipment. More
competition in the equipment market lowers the price in the service
market. Nonetheless, so long as it is efficient to service used equip-
ment—i.e., consumers strictly prefer servicing used equipment to
buying new each period when both equipment and service are priced
at marginal cost—the threat of equipment abandonment can never
drive the price of service to its marginal cost, so the firm will still
never maximize profits by setting the price of service equal to
marginal cost.
One interesting result that follows from this discussion is that
we can characterize the effect that durability has on the exercise of
aftermarket power. We can interpret C  h as a measure of ‘‘durabil-
ity.’’ As the equipment production cost C increases relative to the
quality loss as equipment ages, h, the option to discard one-period-old
Žequipment becomes less attractive the opportunity cost of early
.disposal is greater . Although it is obscured above by our assumption
that C  0, we can replace h with h  C in the above inequalities,
and see that when the new-equipment constraint is binding, an
Ž .increase in durability lower h  C makes the constraint less bind-
ing, so the firm can charge a higher service price without inducing
consumers to scrap used equipment and buy new. Therefore, when
new equipment poses a binding constraint on aftermarket pricing,
greater durability is associated with higher aftermarket prices.
4. A Monopoly in the Equipment Market
To complete the analysis, we consider the case of monopoly in the
equipment market. For the purpose of comparison, we continue to
use a linear spatial model. We assume that the monopolist is located
at the endpoint of the characteristic space in order to make the setup
most similar to the duopoly setting.25
25. An alternative interpretation is for  to be sufficiently large that the marginal
customer for either firm is outside the market of the other firm; there is a gap in the
middle of the market where consumers do not buy either product, so each firm is a
local monopolist.
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A consumer buys equipment, holds it for two periods, and
services it the second period if her total net consumer surplus is
nonnegative; that is, if
 Ž Ž .. Ž . Ž .s   d  P   s   d  h  f q p  p q p  0. 12m m m m
For now we assume that the consumer receives sufficient surplus
from servicing period-old equipment that she does not buy new; we
will return to this assumption later.
ˆThe market boundary of the monopolist, d , is determined bym
the consumer who receives zero surplus:
1ˆ   Ž Ž .. Ž . 4 Ž .d  s  P   s  h  f q p   p , 13m m m mŽ . 1  
Ž . Ž .where  p  p q p , since we continue to assume that produc-m m m
tion costs are zero.26
Consider the value function for a monopolist with initial sales of
d0 . We assume that the monopolist’s market share will be the samem
in every subsequent period, and, as before, we restrict ourselves to
situations in which the firm chooses to charge the same service price
in every period:
1
0 ˆŽ .  Ž . Ž .V  d  p  d P   p . 14m m m m m m 1  
ˆ Ž .Substituting for d from 13 and taking the derivative with respectm
to the equipment price yields the first-order condition for the equip-
ment price. Solving for the optimal equipment price as a function of
the service price gives
1   Ž Ž .. Ž . 4 Ž .P  s   s  h  f q p  2 p . 15m m m2
26. Depending on gross consumer surplus relative to the transportation cost, the
monopolist may or may not serve the entire market. If transport costs are high relative
to gross surplus, the monopolist maximizes profits by not serving the entire market; in
 Ž Ž .. Žparticular, some consumers opt out of the market if s   s  h  f q p  2 1 m
. . If the inequality does not hold, then the monopolist serves the entire market and
d̂  1. We assume that the inequality does hold, so as to most closely parallel them
duopoly situation. The result is that the monopolist faces a linear demand curve with
vertical intercept s and slope  . In this case, both a monopolist and a duopolist face a
trade-off in setting the price of service: as price rises above cost, profits on locked-in
customers rise but profits on future generations of customers fall because the market
share of the firm falls.
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Ž . Ž .Substituting this expression and 13 in 14 yields profit as a function
of service price only:
1 1 20 Ž .   Ž Ž .. 4V  d  p  s   s  h  f q p .m m m mŽ .4 1   1  
Ž .16
Now we can calculate the first-order condition for optimal service
pricing. After rearranging and evaluating at the steady state, i.e.,
0 ˆd  d , we havem m
	 V m   ˆ Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . d p  p  f q q p  0. 17m m m m	 p 1  m
At p  c, total surplus in the service market is maximized, so
Ž . Ž .marginal surplus, which is f  q  , is zero. Then the first-order
condition becomes
	 Vm ˆ Ž . Ž . Ž . d 0  0  0. 18m	 pm p 0m
Thus, the monopolist will charge a price higher than the competitive
price in the aftermarket. The monopolist would like to commit to
charge a competitive service price in all periods, thus maximizing the
value of the equipment to the consumer. The monopolist could then
extract the surplus through the monopoly equipment price. However,
a monopolist that cannot make enforceable commitments will not
charge marginal cost price in the aftermarket, for the same reason a
firm facing competition will not: once the firm has an installed base
of consumers, the firm has an incentive to raise the price of service.27
That is, in any continuation game starting with an installed base, the
rational choice is to not charge p  c in all future periods. Once
again, this result is robust to our assumption that service price is
constant across periods: any nonconstant price path will necessarily
have at least some periods with above-cost pricing.
Ž .27. In a related model of ‘‘open’’ vs. ‘‘closed’’ systems competition, Kende 1998
shows that when there is demand for variable quantities of equipment, and a taste for
aftermarket variety, it will sometimes be in the monopolist’s interest to maintain the
aftermarket monopoly and extract some of the rents from product differentiation
therein, rather than commit to a competitive service market. As in our model, welfare
in Kende’s system is always higher when the aftermarket is competitive.
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy182
Is the departure from competitive aftermarket pricing more
severe for a monopolist than it is for duopolists? To address this
question, we evaluate the monopolist’s first-order condition at the
duopolist’s optimal service price,
	 V m   ˆ Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . d p  p  f q q p . 19m a a a	 p 1  m p pm a
  Ž . Ž .Using the fact that     f  q  , we can rewrite the duopolist’s
Ž .first-order condition, equation 11 , as
	 V a   2Ž̂ . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . d p  p  f q q p  0. 20a a a3	 p 1  a
The first-order conditions for the monopolist and duopolist have
2exactly the same form except for the coefficient of multiplying the3
marginal surplus in the oligopoly expression.
Why does only two-thirds of the marginal effect on consumer
surplus enter the expression for the duopolist? Consider the effect of
reducing service price: in the monopoly situation, gross consumer
surplus from the service-augmented equipment increases. Because
the marginal consumer is choosing between purchasing the equip-
ment or not purchasing the equipment, the monopolist can capture,
via the equipment price, the entire increase in surplus of the marginal
consumer. The alternative available to the margnial customer offers
zero surplus, and that alternative is fixed. In contrast, a duopolist is
not able to capture the entire increase in consumer surplus to the
marginal consumer from a reduction in the service price. Under
duopoly, the marginal consumer is choosing between purchasing the
equipment from the duopolist and from its competitor. As the
duopolist captures more consumers, the marginal consumer it is
attempting to capture is closer to the rival firm and receives greater
surplus from the rival. Thus, it is increasingly difficult to capture
market share as the marginal consumer that the duopolist faces
obtains increasing surplus from her alternative purchase.
ˆ Ž . Since the duopolist’s market share is positive d p  0 , thea
Ž .factor in brackets in equation 20 must be equal to zero when
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evaluated at the duopolist’s optimal price. We can use this fact to
sign the monopolist’s first-order condition evaluated at the duopoly
Ž . Ž .service price. Since f q q p is negative,a
 
    2Ž .  Ž . Ž . Ž .  Ž . Ž . 
 p  f q q p   p  f q q p  0.a a a a31   1  
Ž .21
That is, evaluated at p , the second term in the monopolist’s first-ordera
ˆ Ž .condition is negative. Then, since d p  0, we know that them a
monopolist’s first-order condition would be negative if it charged pa
forever. That means it would make higher profits in a steady state in
which it charged a price below the duopolist’s optimal service price
Ž .assuming concavity of the value function . Thus, while the mono-
polist will exercise its market power over locked-in customers, in this
model it will not do so to the same extent as an imperfectly competi-
tive equipment firm.28
Now we discuss what happens if a customer is permitted to
consider buying new equipment as an alternative to servicing old
equipment. In the second period, a consumer weighs the gain to
abandoning the used equipment and buying new against the gain to
servicing the used equipment and using it for one more period. The
consumer will service used equipment so long as
Ž Ž .. Ž . Ž .s   d  P 	 s   d  h  f q p  p q p . 22m m m m
Suppose that at the optimal equipment and service prices derived
above, where the firm did not consider that consumers might aban-
Ž .don used equipment to buy new, equation 22 did not hold. Then
profits would not be maximized as consumers would never service
equipment. The monopolist will set prices in each market such that
Ž .inequality 22 just holds, in which case the equipment price will be
28. The differing price between monopoly and duopoly may at first seem inconsis-
tent with the claim in the previous section that the aftermarket price is independent of
 in the model. The -irrelevance result holds so long as there is competition between
the firms, i.e., the marginal customer for each firm gets positive consumer surplus from
the product of the other firm. There is a chance in equilibrium behavior at the point
Žthat  relative to the gross consumer surplus from consuming the service-augmented
.equipment becomes large enough that the firms act as separate monopolists and each
consumer buys either from one of the two firms or not at all.
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given by
Ž Ž .. Ž . Ž .P  h  f q p  p q p . 23m m m m
When buying new equipment is a viable alternative to servicing used
equipment, the monopolist in essence has only one degree of free-
Ž . Ž .dom. Substituting 23 into the market boundary condition 13 and
Ž .into the value function 14 leads to a new value function. It can be
shown that, when evaluated at the service price implicitly given by
Ž .17 , the new first-order condition would be negative. Thus, when
new equipment is viable competition to serviced equipment, the
monopolist reduces the price of service and the price of equipment.29
Our main result continues to hold: if the monopolist charges a
constant service price, that price will be higher than marginal cost.
5. Conclusion
Recent antitrust investigations of pricing and practices in aftermar-
kets have hinged on whether firms in reasonably competitive equip-
ment markets could have an incentive to exercise market power in
the associated aftermarkets. We have shown that, regardless of the
structure of the equipment market, a firm that has market power over
sales in its associated aftermarkets will exercise that power at least to
some extent, pricing aftermarket goods and services above their
competitive levels. The trade-off between establishing a low-after-
market-price reputation and extracting profits from locked-in cus-
tomers will always result in elevation of price above the competitive
level. This price elevation is likely to be greater when either high
discount rates or a declining market lowers the value of establishing
a low-price reputation. Competition in the equipment market is more
likely to discipline aftermarket prices when purchasing new equip-
ment is a more viable alternative to servicing old equipment. Intu-
itively, this latter constraint is more binding when equipment is less
29. The latter can be seen as follows: First, denote the equipment and service prices
Ž .   Ž .that do not violate inequality 22 by P and p . Because equation 22 is violated atm m
Ž . Ž .the equipment and service prices characterized by 15 and 17 , we know that
Ž Ž .. Ž .P  h  f q p   p . For the reasons given in the text, we know that them m m
Ž .  Ž Ž ..service price that does not violate 22 , p , is less than the p . Therefore f q p m m m
Ž Ž  .. Ž . Ž  . Ž Ž ..f q p and  p   p . Combining the above facts, we have P  h  f q pm m m m m
Ž . Ž Ž  .. Ž  .  p  h  f q p   p  P .m m m m
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durable—that is, when the net social surplus of servicing and reusing
relative to producing a new unit of equipment is smaller.
The models we explore predict that it is only the inability to
commit that leads to supracompetitive aftermarket pricing. It is easy
to see why a perfect contractual commitment will typically be infeasi-
ble: the service life for durable equipment is often a decade or more,
there are many unverifiable dimensions of service quality, and cost
changes are difficult to verify.30
Beyond the incentive to raise aftermarket prices through an
exercise of market power, however, there are other reasons that a
manufacturer might want to keep its aftermarkets closed. Those
range from quite defensible on public policy and antitrust grounds to
rather suspect.
Shared liability—also known as the finger-pointing problem—is
perhaps the most defensible basis for excluding competitors from
aftermarkets in those cases where it is supported by the evidence. If
an outside vendor services the equipment or provides spare parts and
the equipment then malfunctions, the equipment manufacturer might
be falsely blamed for equipment failure that is actually due to
low-quality workmanship or parts from the outside vendor. The
viability of this defense depends directly on the inability of the
equipment manufacturers, consumers, or courts to sort out the cor-
rect cause of the equipment malfunction.31
Only slightly more controversial is the well-known ‘‘metering’’
explanation, charging high markups on the aftermarket product if
consumption of that product is correlated with the surplus the con-
Ž .sumer gets from the equipment. Oi 1971 and others have demon-
strated that such pricing can raise profits in comparison with a
marginal-cost aftermarket price if consumers are heterogeneous. Such
markups on the aftermarket product can be maintained, however,
only if competitors are not allowed to enter the aftermarket.32
30. We discuss problems with contractual commitments more fully in Borenstein
Ž .et al. 1995 . An indirect approach to committing to downstream competitive pricing
Ž .has been explored in the second-sourcing literature; see, e.g., Shepard 1987 and
Ž . Ž .Riordan and Sappington 1989 . Kende 1995 has extended this literature by modeling
the demand for variety in the aftermarket products.
31. The Supreme Court affirmed this argument in the Jerrold case, but the special
Žfactual circumstances of Jerrold have rarely been found in subsequent cases Jerrold
.Electronics Corp. v. United States, 365 U.S. 567 .
32. This is the standard explanation for IBM’s insistence in the 1950s that con-
sumers of its data-processing machines use only punch cards purchased from IBM.
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy186
In our simple model of imperfect competition there is no role for
metering or price discrimination through above-cost aftermarket
prices. This is due to the assumption that gross consumer surplus and
the cost of switching equipment brands—which is determined by the
parameter  and the location of the consumer along the line—are
uncorrelated with the intensity of use. These assumptions, however,
often are not realistic.33 Higher-intensity users may derive greater
surplus from the machine and have larger costs of switching to
another brand. When usage is correlated with surplus derived andor
the cost of switching between brands, metering can be used for price
discrimination.34 Of course, as usual, price discrimination has am-
biguous social welfare consequences.35
There are other motivations for excluding aftermarket competi-
tion that may be less benign. An equipment firm with market power
may want to exclude competition in the aftermarket in order to
restrict competition in the equipment market, as such restrictions may
reduce the threat of competition from used machines. The tying of
complementary products to implement primary-market foreclosure
Ž .has been studied by Whinston 1990 and by Carlton and Waldman
Ž .1998 . Many manufacturers charge high initial fees or outright refuse
to provide service contracts on used equipment purchased from
an independent broker.36 If the manufacturer is also the service
monopolist, this strategy may effectively foreclose an independent
market for used equipment. By reducing the supply of used equip-
ment, the firm prevents the erosion of equipment market power.
Very closely related, manufacturers may want to monopolize an
aftermarket in order to induce consumers to purchase new equip-
ment or new models earlier than they otherwise would, effectively
reducing the economic durability of the equipment. For example, a
33. For an example of product differentiation that is correlated with intensity of
use, consider the three sellers of high-volume copiers in the early years of that mar-
ket: Kodak, Xerox and IBM. IBM specialized in copiers for the lower end of the
Ž .high-volume market 50,000100,000 copies per month . Kodak specialized in copiers
for 100,000500,000 copies per month. Xerox specialized in very-high-volume copiers
Ž .300,0001,000,00 copies per month .
34. Indeed, almost all high-volume copier service contracts have a base charge and
Ž .a per-copy ‘‘click’’ charge. Clearly, service costs tend to vary with usage, but the click
charge may be used for metering as well.
Ž .35. See Chen and Ross 1993 for a model in which firms with equipment market
Ž .power use the aftermarket to implement price discrimination. Emch 1999 tests the
metering theory and our theory, which he calls ‘‘opportunism,’’ in the printer toner
and printer memory markets. He finds some support for the opportunism theory.
36. This was one of the allegations in the Kodak case, for example.
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firm may be able to force consumers to move to the newest model of
equipment by no longer servicing old models of equipment. This
effect will not obtain if service is available from other vendors.37
Finally, exclusion of aftermarket competition may be motivated
by the desire to influence the flow of information to customers. This
is known in the industry as account control: regular visits from the
manufacturer’s field technicians can be used to influence future
equipment upgrade and expansion decisions. Service provision by an
independent technician may provide the customer with a low-cost
source of independent information on the advantages of alternative
brands for future purchases.
All of these reasons for exclusion of aftermarket rivals have
been supported by evidence in various cases over the last decade.
Some may be harmful to consumers, while others may be procompet-
itive. Nonetheless, we have shown that once competition in the
aftermarket is excluded, a profit-maximizing firm will not maintain
competitive prices in the aftermarket, regardless of the degree of
competition in the equipment market.
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